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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
l

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v*

:

DONALD WAYNE BROWN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900148

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of second degree
murder, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203
(1990), and aggravated assault, a third degree felony, under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's

motion to suppress certain evidence seized without a warrant from
the trailer in which he resided?
The factual findings underlying the trial court's
ruling on the motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal
unless they are clearly erroneous.
1258 (Utah 1987).

State v. Ashe# 745 P.2d 1255,

However, in assessing the trial court's legal

conclusions based on its factual findings, the appellate court

applies a "correction of error" standard of review.
Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 42,

State v.

43 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1990).

Accord United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir.
1990).

But see State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah

1985) (which suggests that the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review applies to both the trial court's factual determinations
and legal conclusion).
2.

Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of

defendant's prior bad acts?
Defendant failed to preserve this issue for review.
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110
S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Van Matre# 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah
1989).
3.

Has defendant demonstrated that reversible error

occurred when the prosecutor referred to him as a "mad dog" in
closing argument?
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the
Court "must determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls [sic] to
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified
in considering in reaching the verdict and, if so, whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced the
jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent
the misconduct."
4.

State v. Speerf 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988).

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in giving

an "Allen" charge to the jury?
Defendant did not preserve for appeal his objection to
the trial court's "Allen" instruction.
1021, 1023 (Utah 1987).
-2-

State v. Medina, 738 P.2d

5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

allowing the jury to deliberate for an extended period of time?
The question of how long to keep the jury in
deliberations is discretionary with the trial court; therefore,
its decision will not be disturbed unless it abused its
discretion.

State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct. App.

1988).
6.

Was there sufficient evidence to support

defendant's conviction of aggravated assault?
An appellate court will reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted."

State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345

(Utah 1985) (citations omitted).
7.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

assessing the costs of defense to defendant as part of his
sentence?
An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by
a trial court only if the sentence represents an abuse of
discretion, if the trial court fails to consider all relevant
factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed
by law.

State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989).
8.

Did defendant preserve for appeal the issue of

whether it was appropriate for a part-time city attorney to
represent defendant as appointed counsel, and does he demonstrate

-3-

that grounds for reversal exist on the basics of the record
before this Court?
Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.
Stegqell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).

State v.

Also, this Court will

not rule on a question that depends for its existence on alleged
facts unsupported by the record.

State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d

289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983).
9.

Was defendant denied effective assistance of

counsel at trial?
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result of the trial would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Donald Wayne Brown, was charged with second
degree murder, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 765-203 (1990), and two counts of aggravated assault, a third
degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (R. 2-5).
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After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of
second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault
423-25).

(R.

The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms at

the Utah State Prison of five years to life for the murder and
zero to five years for the aggravated assault (R. 427-29).

The

court also ordered defendant to pay restitution and costs (R.
428).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A lengthy recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes
is not necessary to the resolution of the issues raised on
appeal.

Defendant's convictions arose out of an incident in

which he and others killed Miguel Rameriz and he assaulted
Richard C. Anderson at a brine shrimp harvesting camp on the
Great Salt Lake in October 1989.
Additional facts pertinent to the issues raised on
appeal are set forth in the argument portion of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress certain items seized by the police in a warrantless
search of the trailer in which defendant resided when he worked
for Western Brine Shrimp ("WSB").

The search was lawfully

conducted pursuant to the consent of WSB's owner/property manager
who had common authority over the common areas of the trailer
searched.

The items defendant challenges were properly seized

under the plain view doctrine.

Defendant was bound over to district court for trial on only
one count of aggravated assault (R. 1).

-5-

Defendant did not preserve for appeal his claim that
the trial court admitted evidence of defendant's prior aggressive
behavior in violation of rules 404 and 405, Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Defendant did not object to that evidence at trial on

the same grounds he now presents on appeal.
Defendant fails to demonstrate that reversible error
occurred when the prosecutor referred to him as a "mad dog" in
closing argument.

Although the prosecutor's characterization of

defendant as a "mad dog" in closing argument was probably
improper, there is no reasonable likelihood that the improper
remark so prejudiced the jury that there would have been a more
favorable result for defendant in its absence.
Defendant did not preserve for appeal his objection to
the trial court's "Allen" instruction.

Defendant did not object

at trial to the instruction he now challenges on appeal.
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion in keeping the jury together for a period
of 13*5 hours after a full day of trial.

The trial court's denial

of defendant's motion to recess the jury was consistent with
reasoned authority from other jurisdictions.
There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's
conviction of aggravated assault.

The jury reasonably exercised

its preprogative in concluding that defendant's conduct amounted
to a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence.
Because it appears from the record that the trial court
failed to consider the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-32A-3

-6-

(1990) in ordering that defendant reimburse the county for the
costs of his defense, this Court should remand the case to the
trial court for reconsideration of this aspect of defendant's
sentence.
Defendant did not preserve for appeal the issue of
whether it was appropriate for a part-time attorney to represent
defendant as appointed counsel; alternatively, defendant fails to
demonstrate that grounds for reversal exist on the basis of the
record before this Court.

Defendant did not object in the trial

court to the appointment of counsel he now alleges was a parttime city attorney and prosecutor who had an inherent conflict of
interest.

Furthermore, the record does not establish that

appointed counsel held a prosecutor position at the time he
represented defendant.
Defendant fails to demonstrate that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel at trial under the test
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
In response to a number of the issues raised by
defendant in this appeal, the State argues that, because the
issue was not raised in the trial court, it was not preserved for
appeal and therefore should not be considered by this Court.

The

State cites case law from this Court that directly supports this
position.

However, a recent decision, State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d

798 (Utah 1990), has created some ambiguity concerning the
application of well established waiver/procedural default rules,
and has led to troublesome decisions from the Utah Court of
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Appeals.

Therefore, because of its potential impact on the

waiver arguments made in this brief, the State will first address
the Jameson problem.
In Jameson, an appeal from a probation revocation, the
defendant argued that due to misconduct by the judge and the
prosecutor, the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy barred a second revocation hearing.

Noting that this

issue had been raised for the first time on appeal, a fact that
would normally preclude review, the Court nevertheless considered
itself obligated to address the defendant's argument "because it
is based on a constitutional question and [the] defendant's
liberty is at stake."

800 P.2d at 803.

The Court did not

explain this exception but simply cited to State v. Breckenridge,
688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983), and Pratt v. City Council of
Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah 1981).
In Breckenridge, the Court addressed issues concerning
the validity of the defendant's guilty plea, raised for the first
time at oral argument before the Court, because "[t]he general
rule that constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot be
raised on appeal is excepted to when a person's liberty are at
stake."

688 P.2d at 443 (citing Pratt, 639 P.2d at 173-74).

Court, explaining the liberty interest at stake, said that
because "Breckenridge's felony conviction and sentence rest on
the outcome of his appeal," it would address the issue of the
validity of his plea on a ground raised for the first time on
appeal.

Ibid.

-8-

The

The difficulty with the liberty interest exception
applied by the Breckenridge Court to a criminal case is that, for
all practical purposes, in a criminal case the defendant's
liberty is always at stake.

That is, it is always true that the

defendant's "conviction and sentence rest on the outcome of his
[or her] appeal."

Breckenridge/ 688 P.2d at 443.

Thus, on its

face, the Breckenridge liberty interest exception, although not
frequently argued by defendants on appeal or relied upon by the
Court, effectively eliminates waiver as a ground for not
considering an issue raised for the first time on appeal.
The Utah Court of Appeals has endeavored in two recent
criminal cases to distinguish between issues where a liberty
interest is at stake and those where that interest is not at
stake.

See State v. Harrison, 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 24 n.13

(Utah Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1991) (no liberty interest at stake where
issue concerned gender bias of prosecution's peremptory
challenges; thus, issue would not be considered for first time on
appeal); State v. Hargraves, No. 890684-CA, slip op. at 5-6
(Utah Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1991) (challenge to search would be
considered for first time on appeal; "a liberty interest is
involved because the search produced evidence critical to
Hargraves's conviction and incarceration"). The distinctions
made in these two cases are at best questionable.

Indeed, the

court of appeals recognized the the difficulties inherent in
applying the liberty interest exception in a criminal case.
Harrison, it wrote:
We note a recent Utah Supreme Court
opinion suggesting that when a constitutional
-Q-

In

question involving liberty is presented, the
appellate court is "obliged" to consider it
even though it was not raised in the trial
court. State v. Jamesonf 146 Utah Adv. Rep.
3, 5 (1990). This "obligation" has not been
evident in previous cases where Utah's
appellate courts have refused to entertain
constitutional challenges to criminal
convictions, with incarceration (and
therefore liberty) at stake, when those
challenges had not been raised below. We
believe that "the interest of predictability,
accountability, and fairness" would be served
by a more careful examination of when Utah's
appellate courts will consider issues not
raised in the trial courts. We further
believe that the previously enunciated
standards allowing first-time appellate
review of issues are sufficiently liberal to
provide appropriate redress, and are
therefore troubled by a standard requiring
review whenever a "liberty" interest is
identified.
Slip op. at 14-15 n.13 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
The State agrees with the gist of the court of appeals'
observations in Harrison:

the liberty interest exception is not

susceptible to predictable, consistent, and fair application in
criminal cases, where the defendant's liberty interest is always
at stake.

If, in criminal cases, the waiver/procedural default

rule is to continue as a viable basis for not reaching an issue
raised for the first time on appeal, and if that rule is to be
consistently and fairly applied, the Court should abandon any
notion of a liberty interest exception and rely solely on the
2
plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions to the

2

See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah) (explaining
plain error rule), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); Jolivet v.
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989) (noting exceptional
circumstances exception), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990).
-10-

waiver/procedural default rule when considering issues raised for
the first time on appeal.

The latter exceptions adequately and

appropriately provide relief from waiver, without the inherent
ambiguities associated with the liberty interest exception.
Indeed, the Breckenridge case, the genesis of the liberty
interest exception in criminal cases, could have just as easily
been decided under the plain error rule.

In short, abandoning

the liberty interest exception will not prejudice a criminal
defendant's right to full and fair consideration of issues that
should be reviewed even though raised for the first time on
appeal, and will guarantee a consistent application of the
3
Court's waiver/procedural default rule.
See State v. Anderson,
789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990) (where the Court appropriately
applied the waiver/procedural default rule to a constitutional
claim raised for the first time on appeal and concludes that the
The importance of consistent application of a state procedural
default rule is illustrated in Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377,
1382-83 (10th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990).
There, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear that the
procedural default rule of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977), which bars federal habeas review when the state courts
have declined to review an issue due to a procedural default by
the defendant (e.g., failure to comply with a state
contemporaneous objection rule), does not apply when the state
procedural default rule has not been consistently applied. The
existence of the Breckenridge liberty interest exception, which
has already created an arguably inconsistent application of
Utah's waiver/procedural default rule by the Utah Court of
Appeals in Harrison and Hargraves , invites wholesale federal
habeas review of this Court's and the court of appeals' decisions
that have disposed of federal questions on the basis of waiver.
That sort of pervasive review of state court decisions is clearly
undesirable, in that it undermines the state's weighty interest
in the finality of criminal judgments. See Boggess v. Morris,
635 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1981) (emphasizing that "integrity of the
criminal justice system requires a finality of judgment that
should limit repetitive appeals and collateral attacks" once the
normal appellate process has concluded).
-11-

plain error rule was inapplicable).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously
denied his pretrial motion to suppress his knife and a clothes
bag containing a pair of pants and a shirt, all of which were
seized in a warrantless search of a trailer at Western Brine
Shrimp's camp on the Great Salt Lake.
At the hearing on defendant's motion, the following
relevant evidence was presented.

Early in the morning on October

26, 1989, several officers of the Box Elder County Sheriff's
Department responded to a report of a possible assault at a
Western Brine Shrimp camp located on the west shore of the Great
Salt Lake.

When the officers arrived, they noticed the dead

victim on the ground and an individual, later identified as
Raymond Cabututan, come out from between two of the trailers that
were on the premises (there were a total of four trailers at the
camp, which were referred to at the hearing as trailer #1,
trailer #2, trailer #3, and trailer #4).

Pursuant to the

officers' order, defendant, Billy Cayer, and William Cummins
4
exited trailer #3.
After the officers had conducted cursory
searches of all four trailers to check for other individuals and
weapons, they handcuffed defendant and the other three suspects
and placed them in trailer #4 (Transcr. of Motion to Suppress
4
Cabututan, Cayer and Cummins, along with defendant, were
charged with the murder of Miguel Ramirez (R. 2).
-12-

Hearing 1/24/89 (hereafter "TA.") 10-16).
Defendant, who was an employee of Western Brine Shrimp
("WBS"), lived with several other persons in trailer #3 while he
was at the camp.

WBS provided room and board to its employees

(many of whom were transient workers) as part of their employment
at the camp.

Because trailer #3 had the best and biggest

refrigerator, it was the primary location for storage of
perishable food for the entire camp.

Everyone at the camp had

access to the food in trailer #3 even if they lived in another
trailer.

The door to trailer #3 was never locked, as none of the

trailers had a lock.

The business's radios which were used by

those at the camp were stored in trailer #3 and accessible to
everyone.

According to one of the investigating officers, there

appeared to be personal property in trailer #3. And, according
to Richard Anderson, a resident of the camp at the time of the
crimes, the common practice was to knock on the doors of the
trailers before entering, and "[residents of the camp] had common
respect not to go into somebody else's trailer unless they were
there" (TA. 39, 51-53, 60, 66, 70).
Two of the officers at the scene entered trailer #3
pursuant to requests from certain of the suspects that cigarettes
and medicine be retrieved for them.

When the officers entered

trailer #3 to look for those items, they observed in plain view a
number of items that appeared to be evidence associated with the
homicide of Miguel Ramirez (e.g., a cardboard box which appeared
to have bloodstains on it, boots and tennis shoes which also
appeared to have blood on them, a crescent wrench, and a knife);
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however, none of those items was seized at that time (TA. 28-29,
74-76, 82, 85).
After defendant and the other suspects were removed
from the area, Officer Yeates, with assistance from Richard
Anderson, entered trailer #3, picked up a radio, and then stepped
back outside.

Yeates contacted Pat Bentzley, one of the owner's

of WBS and the manager of the business's property, and requested
permission to search the trailers.

Bentzley told him that the

police could search all the trailers.

Once Bentzley had granted

this permission to the police, they entered trailer #3 without a
warrant and seized various items, including the clothes bag that
defendant argues the trial court should have suppressed.

The

following day, an officer returned to the scene, entered trailer
#3 without a warrant, and seized the knife whose admission
defendant also challenges on appeal (TA. 50, 58, 83-96).
Although the trial court's oral ruling denying
defendant's motion to suppress is not entirely clear with respect
to some of its legal reasoning (e.g., the court's discussion of
the search incident to arrest exception (TA. 119-20)), it very
clearly holds that the warrantless searches of trailer #3 during
which the clothes bag and knife were seized were lawful because
they were conducted pursuant to the consent of Pat Bentzley who,
as an owner of WBS and manager of its property, had
actual authority to consent to a police entry into the common
areas of the trailers.

The court said:

I do think that the consent can be given by
anybody to the common areas of those
buildings. I think the testimony is that
people came and went, the[y] shared, they had
-14-

company things stored in those areas[,] that
they from time to time cooked for each other.
And I don't think that the owner can give as
much consent as he thinks he can. And that
is, to go to anything that's located on the
premises, I don't share that view. But I do
think he can give consent to go into the
common areas of the trailers and other things
that he owns or controls there. Everybody
else could. And certainly he could as well.
And he can give consent for others to do
that, in my judgment. . . .
(TA. 118-19).5
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress cannot be sustained on any of
the grounds relied upon by the trial court in concluding that the
warrantless searches of trailer #3 were lawful:

(1) search

incident to arrest; (2) exigent circumstances; (3) plain view;
and (4) consent of the owner.

Because the court's reliance on

Although oral rulings on motions to suppress are sometimes very
clearly stated and thus easily reviewed by an appellate court,
the oral ruling in this case is, at times, difficult to follow.
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently recognized that, if the
appellate courts are to conduct meaningful review of a trial
court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must set
forth clear findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of
its ruling. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 n.l (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied,
P.2d
(Utah 1990) (recognizing
need for clear and complete findings); State v. Loveqren, 798
P.2d 767, 770-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (remanding case to trial
court for entry of adequate findings in support of ruling on
motion to suppress). This Court should adopt a similar
requirement. And, while oral rulings may be sufficient in some
cases, the better practice would be to enter a written order
which clearly sets out, under separate headings, the predicate
findings of fact and the ultimate conclusions of law. This is
particularly true in a case such as this one, where multiple
issues of fact and law are presented.
Defendant's analysis of the search and seizure issue proceeds
under fourth amendment law; he makes no effort to analyze the
question under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Therefore, the State's response will necessarily be limited to a
discussion of federal law. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239/
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in a
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the search incident to arrest and exigent circumstance exceptions
to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement is questionable,
the State will discuss only the court's determination that the
search and seizure were lawful pursuant to valid consent and the
7
plain view doctrine.
The central question is whether the court correctly
concluded that Pat Bentzley, WBS owner and property manager, had
actual authority to consent to the search by police of trailer
#3.

In short, did Bentzley have common authority with defendant

and the other residents of the camp over at least the common
areas of trailer #3?

The standard for determining whether common

authority exists was enunciated in United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164 (1974):
The authority which justifies the third-party
consent does not rest upon the law of
property, with its attendant historical and
legal refinements, . . . but rests rather on
mutual use of the property by persons
generally having joint access or control for
most purposes, so that it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has
the right to permit the inspection in his own
right and that the others have assumed the
risk that one of their number might permit
the common area to be searched.
Id. at 171 n.7.

See also State v. Johnson,, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-

74 (Utah 1987).

The State bears the burden of proving common

authority, but it must do so by only a preponderance of the
evidence.

Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177.

See also State v. Kendrick,

Cont. state constitutional analysis unless an argument for
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions are
briefed.").
7
The prosecutor clearly concentrated on consent and plain view
in his argument to the trial court (TA. 110-17).
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47 Wash.App. 620, 736 P.2d 1079, 1086 (1987).

Under these

standards, the trial court correctly concluded that the State had
sustained its burden of proving that Bentzley had common
authority over at least the common areas of trailer #3 and that
he voluntarily consented to the police entry into the common
areas• 9
Trailer #3 was readily accessible to all employees of
the camp, at least with respect to those parts of the trailer
that contained the perishable food and the radios—items that
were available to and used by all employees.
recognized "common areas" within the trailer.
door to trailer #3 was never locked.

Thus, there were
Furthermore, the

And although courtesies

such as not entering a trailer when its occupants were not there
and knocking on a trailer's door before entering were generally
followed by the camp's employees, there appears to be no dispute
that any employee was free to enter trailer #3 at any time to
obtain food or a radio.

This same freedom of access would

reasonably apply to the owner and manager of the property, Mr.
It does not appear that this Court has ever expressly stated
what burden of proof applies at a suppression hearing. However,
in Matlock, the Supreme Court made clear that "the controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater
burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." 415 U.S.
at 178 n.14 (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-489
(1972)). Based upon the rationale for the preponderance standard
expressed in Lego, 404 U.S. at 486-87, this Court should
expressly adopt a similar standard for Utah. See, e.g., United
States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990); State v.
Cress, 576 A.2d 1366, 1367 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d
425, 427 (R.I. 1990); People v. Henderson, 220 Cal.App.3d 1632,
270 Cal.Rptr. 248, 257 (1990).
g
Defendant challenges only the trial court's conclusion that
Bentzley had authority to consent to the search of the trailer;
he does not question the voluntariness of that consent.
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Bentzley, who also had the status of employer*
The common areas of trailer #3, which were associated
with the employment activities of WBS (i.e., access to food was a
benefit of employment and access to the radios was a necessary
part of employment), are properly viewed as part of the business
premises over which the employer/owner/manager would have common
authority.

See, e.g., United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292,

296-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding consent given by co-owner of
hotel to search of office there used by manager of hotel, where
hotel's records kept, and used by others as well for a variety of
purposes); Donovan v. A.A. Biero Construction Co., 746 F.2d 894,
898-900 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (D.C. government, for whom structure
being built, could consent to search of common areas at
construction site to which contractors and D.C. all had access);
State v. Kendrick, 736 P.2d at 1086 (employer/owner had authority
to consent to search of his premises where defendant employee had
a "crash pad").

The situation here was not, as defendant

suggests, a landlord-tenant relationship under which Bentzley, as
a landlord, would not have had the authority to consent to a
police search of the premises.

See Chapman v. United States, 365

U.S. 610 (1961); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 66
(1967).

Nor was it a relationship akin to that which exists

between a hotel and a guest, where the hotel is not free to
consent to a police search of a rented room.

See Stoner v.

California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964),
In sum, the trial court did not err in concluding that
Bentzley had authority to consent to the search of trailer #3.
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Even if this Court were to decide that the trial
court's conclusion was erroneous, admission of the challenged
evidence would still be proper under Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110
S. Ct. 2793 (1990).

There, the Supreme Court held that a police

officer may validly search a place without a warrant pursuant to
the consent of a person if the officer reasonably believes that
the person has the authority to consent to the search, even
though it may later be determined by a court that the person did
not actually have such authority.

The Court stated that a

"determination of consent to enter must 'be judged against an
objective standard:

would the facts available to the officer at

the moment . . . 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the consenting party had authority over the
premises?"

110 S. Ct. at 2801 (citation omitted).

Applying this

standard to the facts of the instant case, exclusion of the
challenged evidence would not be warranted.

Under the

circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer Yeates, who received
permission from Bentzley to search trailer #3, to believe that
Bentzley, the owner/manager of the premises and defendant's
employer, had authority to consent to the search.
Finally, there is no merit to defendant's additional
argument that, even if the officers were lawfully present in the
trailer, they could not justifiably seize the clothes bag and the
knife under the plain view doctrine.

The plain view doctrine

"allows the seizure of an item that is in the plain view of an
officer who has lawfully entered the area and has probable cause
to believe that the item is evidence of a crime."
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State v.

Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted)also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987)-

See

Defendant does

not claim that the clothes bag and the knife were not in plain
view or that probable cause to believe they were evidence of a
crime did not exist; he simply argues that those items were not
observed until the police had entered the trailer with the
purpose to search for and seize evidence-

That the items were

seen later rather than earlier does not invalidate the plain view
seizure where the officers were lawfully in the trailer when they
saw them.

And, insofar as defendant's argument concerning the

seizure of the knife suggests that the discovery of evidence in
plain view must be inadvertent under the plain view doctrine, the
United States Supreme Court recently held that inadvertence is
not a necessary condition of a legitimate plain view seizure.
Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
POINT II
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL HIS
CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED EVIDENCE
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN
VIOLATION OF RULES 404 AND 405, UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE.
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously
admitted evidence of defendant's prior aggressive behavior in
violation of rules 404 and 405, Utah Rules of Evidence.

However,

this particular challenge to the evidence was not preserved for
appeal•
"Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires 'a clear and
definite objection' at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for
appeal."

State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert.
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denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989).

To preserve a particular objection

to evidence for appeal, a defendant must have specifically stated
to the trial court the same grounds for objection presented on
appeal.

State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); State

v. Davis# 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984).

Here, when the prosecution

elicited evidence of defendant's prior aggressive behavior,
defendant objected that the questioning was beyond the scope of
cross-examination (T. 432); no rule 404 or rule 405 objection was
made.

Therefore, he is not entitled to assert a violation of

those rules as a ground for error on appeal.

Van Matre, 777 P.2d

at 462. 10
POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE PROSECUTOR
REFERRED TO HIM AS A "MAD DOG" IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT.
In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor at one
point said in reference to defendant and his accomplices, "There
isn't one of us here who knows how we would react in a situation
like that with four mad dogs out there beating on someone" (T.
911).

Not immediately but shortly after that comment was made,

defendant objected to the characterization "mad dogs" (T. 912).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment requires reversal
of his convictions.
This Court has recognized that "[cjounsel for both
sides have 'considerably more freedom in closing argument' and 'a
Defendant does not assert that the Court should consider his
argument under the plain error rule. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d);
State v, Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35 (setting out requirements for
demonstrating plain error).
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right to discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and
the inferences and deductions arising therefrom.'"

State v.

Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v.
Lafferty# 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v.
Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973)).

However,

while some courts have approved a prosecutor's reference to the
defendant as a "mad dog," see, e.g., Johnson v. Zant, 249 Ga.
812, 295 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982), most courts have disapproved of
the use of that characterization in argument.

See, e.g., Collier

v. State, 103 Nev. 563, 747 P.2d 225, 227 (1987); State v.
Hawkins, 292 S.C. 418, 357 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1987); State v. Music,
79 Wash.2d 699, 489 P.2d 159, 170 (1971).

Thus, the prosecutor's

reference to defendant as a "mad dog" was probably improper.

The

real question is whether it constitutes reversible error.
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the
Court "must determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls [sic] to
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified
in considering in reaching the verdict and, if so, whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced the
jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent
the misconduct."

State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988)

(citations omitted).

Assuming that the prosecutor's reference to

"mad dogs" was improper, there simply is no reasonable likelihood
that the improper remark so prejudiced the jury that there would
have been a more favorable result for defendant in its absence.
There was substantial testimonial and physical evidence of

-22-

defendant's guilt.11

See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah

1984) ("'If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged
conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial.'").
Furthermore, the prosecutor used the term "mad dogs" only once, a
single remark that prompted neither an immediate objection nor a
motion for mistrial from defendant.

In short, the prosecutor's

improper comment, standing alone, does not warrant reversal of
defendant's convictions.

See Collier v. State, 747 P.2d at 227

(improper "mad dog" remark did not warrant reversal); State v.
Gillihan, 86 N.M. 439, 524 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1974) (same); State
v. Music, 489 P.2d at 170 (same).
POINT IV
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL HIS
OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL COURT'S "ALLEN"
INSTRUCTION.
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously gave
an "Allen" 12 instruction to the jury at the beginning of its

Contrary to the suggestion in defendant's brief that the three
eyewitnesses' testimony varied greatly on the issue of
defendant's involvement in the beating of the victim, there was
clear testimony from one eyewitness, Richard Anderson, which was
not contradicted by the two other eyewitnesses, that defendant
directly participated in the beating. Anderson, who was in one
of the camp trailers and witnessed the brutal beating of the
victim, repeatedly and positively identified defendant as one of
several men who kicked, punched, and beat the victim (T. 301442). During the incident, he saw in defendant's hand a crescent
wrench which was used on the victim (T. 319-20). Furthermore, he
testified that when he encountered defendant shortly after the
beating had ended, defendant said something on the order of
"Yeah, we kicked that old boy[']s butt pretty bad" (T. 337).
This direct evidence of defendant's guilt, standing alone, was
compelling.
12

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). See also State
v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1022 n.l (Utah 1987) (discussing
"Allen" instruction); State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 29-31 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (adopting modified "Allen" instruction for Utah).
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deliberations (see instruction no. 50; R. 417). However, he did
not preserve this issue for appeal.
"The usual rule is that '[n]o party may assign as error
any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.'"
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (quoting rule
19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure).
John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989).

See also State v.

Defendant did not object to

Instruction No. 50 at trial; accordingly, the Court should not
consider his challenge to it for the first time on appeal. 13
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO DELIBERATE FOR AN
EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME.
Defendant argues that the trial court denied him due
process and a fair trial under the state and federal
constitutions by allowing the jury to deliberate continuously for
13*$ hours after a full day of trial.

The Court should summarily

reject this argument.
The jury apparently began its deliberations at
approximately 5:30 p.m. (T. 942-43).

At 3:30 a.m., after the

jury had been deliberating for ten hours, defendant moved that
the jury "be allowed to separate or be sequestered" (T. 942).
The court indicated that it would have the bailiff check with the
13
Defendant does not argue that, even in the absence of an
objection below, the Court should consider his challenge to the
instruction under rule 19(c)fs "manifest injustice" exception to
the waiver rule. Thus, the Court should dispose of defendant's
argument on the basis of waiver.
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jurors and determine whether they wished to continue their
deliberations (T. 943), At 4s30 a.m., the bailiff reported that,
when asked whether they had reached a verdict and how they were
coming, the jurors indicated that they "were moving along" and
"shouldn't be much longer" (T. 943-44).

At 6:45 a.m., the jury

returned its verdicts (T. 944-46).
The question of how long to keep the jury in
deliberations is discretionary with the trial court.

State v.

Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Munden v. State,
698 P.2d 621, 625-26 (Wyo. 1985).

Given that the jurors did not

indicate a desire to discontinue their deliberations, and in fact
indicated that they were nearing verdicts after approximately
eleven hours of deliberations, the court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing them to continue over defendant's
objection.

Other courts have upheld trial court decisions to

keep the jury in deliberations for comparably long periods of
time.

See, e.g., State v. Smith/ 66 Or.App. 374, 675 P.2d 1060,

1066 (11 hours of deliberation), review denied, 297 Or. 339, 683
P.2d 1370 (1984); Farmer v. State, 95 Nev. 849, 603 P.2d 700, 704
(1979) (12 hours of deliberation the day before verdict returned
and 9 hours day of verdict).

Defendant has not demonstrated that

the court's ruling denied him due process or a fair trial under
the state and federal constitutions.14 The single case he relies
upon, Isom v. State, 481 So.2d 820 (Miss. 1985), is

Defendant fails to support his allegation of a constitutional
violation with legal analysis or authority. Thus, the Court
could decline to consider his claim on this basis alone. State
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
-25-

distinguishable from his case, in that there the court kept the
jury in deliberations for an excessive period even though three
jurors desired to recess.

Id. at 824.
POINT VI

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
Defendant claims that the State presented insufficient
evidence to support his conviction of aggravated assault because
the evidence did not establish that he exhibited "a show of
immediate force or violence."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(b)

(1990).
This Court will not reverese a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence unless the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted."

State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345

(Utah 1985) (citations omitted).

Here, Richard Anderson, the

victim of defendant's aggravated assault, testified that when he
stepped from his trailer to investigate the beating that was
occurring outside a short distance away, defendant raised a
crescent wrench he had in his right hand, pulled it back, and
said to Anderson, "Do you want some of this too?" (T. 319-20).
Based on that evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that
defendant had made "a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence," section 76-5-102(1)(b), such that he was
guilty of an assault.

Contrary to defendant's suggestion,

defendant's conduct was not, as a matter of law, only a violation
-26-

of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1990)
P.2d 862 (Utah 1979).

. See State v. Verdinf 595

As noted in Verdin, "The distinctions in

levels of proscribed conduct [in sections 76-5-103(1)(b)
(aggravated assault) and 76-10-506] are clear and easily
comprehended."

3id. at 862.

Even though the jury could have

convicted defendant of a violation of section 76-10-506 (see
instruction no. 17; R. 379), the evidence presented established
all the elements of aggravated assault and it was within the
jury's prerogative to find the more serious crime.

Ibid.

Therefore, defendant's insufficiency claim is without merit.
POINT VII
BECAUSE IT APPEARS FROM THE RECORD THAT THE
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32A-3
(1990) IN ORDERING THAT DEFENDANT REIMBURSE
THE COUNTY FOR THE COSTS OF HIS DEFENSE, THIS
COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE TO THE TRIAL
COURT FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THIS ASPECT OF
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering him to reimburse the county for the costs
of his defense pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32a-l and -2
(1990) (T. 953-54).
An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by
a trial court only if the sentence represents an abuse of
Section 76-10-506 provides:
Every person, except those persons
described in Section 76-10-503, who, not in
necessary self defense in the presence of two
or more persons, draws or exhibits any
dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening
manner or unlawfully uses the same in any
fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
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discretion, if the trial court fails to consider all relevant
factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed
by law.

State v, Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989).

Here, it does not appear from the record that the trial court
adequately considered defendant's financial status before
assessing defendant the costs of his defense.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-32a-3 (1990) provides:
The court shall not include in the
judgment a sentence that a defendant pay
costs unless the defendant is or will be able
to pay them. In determining the amount and
method of payment of costs, the court shall
take account of the financial resources of
the defendant and the nature of the burden
that payment of the costs will impose and
that restitution be the first priority.
The court did not comply with this section before ordering
payment of costs (T. 953-55).

Accordingly, defendant's case

should be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of that
order in light of section 77-32a-3.
POINT VIII
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR A
PART-TIME CITY ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT
DEFENDANT AS APPOINTED COUNSEL;
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL EXIST ON THE BASIS
OF THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT.
Defendant contends that he was denied due process when
the court appointed as his trial counsel Thomas Willmore who, he
claims, was a part-time city attorney and prosecutor.

He argues

that Mr. Willmore's part-time employment as a prosecutor
constituted an inherent conflict of interest which may have
prejudiced defendant.

-28-

The Court need not, in the context of this case,
address the question of whether it is appropriate for a
prosecutor from another jurisdiction to represent a criminal
defendant as appointed or retained counsel.

First, defendant did

not preserve this issue for review, having not objected to Mr.
Willmore's appointment on that basis below.

It is well settled

that, absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.

State v.

Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990); State v. Steggell, 660
P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).

Defendant does not allege any-

exceptional circumstances that would relieve him of the waiver,
and there appear to be none.

Second, the record in this case

does not establish that Mr. Willmore was a part-time city
attorney and prosecutor at the time he was appointed to represent
defendant.

The exchange that Mr. Willmore had with a prospective

juror during jury voir dire (T. 84-86), which defendant now
claims demonstrates that Willmore was a part-time city prosecutor
at the time he represented defendant, indicates nothing more than
that Willmore had prosecuted the juror's family member the
previous year for Garland City.

With nothing more than this

brief exchange during voir dire to support his contention
regarding Willmore's alleged status as a prosecutor, defendant is
in no positon to ask this Court to review his conflict of
interest claim.

See State v. Wulffensteinf 657 P.2d 289, 293

(Utah 1982) ("This Court simply cannot rule on a question which
depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the
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record."), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983).
POINT IX
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS
DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT
TRIAL.
Defendant claims he was denied effective assistance of
counsel at trial because his appointed counsel was not adequately
prepared to cross-examine two of the State's witnesses and,
despite defendant's request, declined to call a particular
witness.
As defendant points out, his pretrial request to
represent himself was granted by the court after it had conducted

The State would note in passing that although some courts have
found that representation of a criminal defendant by an attorney
who is also a prosecutor is not prohibited as a matter of law,
see, e.g., Caffrey v. Solent/ 400 N.W.2d 281 (S.D. 1987) (the
defendant's representation at new trial by court-appointed
attorney who had been appointed state's attorney for adjoining
county during pendency of appeal of original conviction did not
constitute conflict of interest); State v. Mitchell/ 356 So.2d
974, 977 (La.) (assistant city prosecutor is not prohibited from
defending a criminal prosecution in state district court), cert.
denied# 356 U.S. 974 (1978), the better view appears to be that,
due to the inherent potential for conflict of interest, a public
prosecutor should not defend or assist in the defense of persons
accused of crime, see, e.g., Howerton v. State# 640 P.2d 566
(Okl. Cr. 1982) (a member of the bar who is a part-time district
attorney may not be appointed to defend persons either within or
outside jurisdiction in which he or she serves as assistant
district attorney); People v. Rhodes/ 115 Cal.Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d
363 (1974) (city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities may
not defend or assist in the defense of persons accused of crime;
nature and duties of a public prosecutor are inherently
incompatible with the obligations of a criminal defense counsel).
See also Rule 1.7, Rules of Professional Conduct. Indeed, Utah
Code Ann. § 17-18-2(10)(a) (Supp. 1990) states that "[a] county
attorney may not in any manner consult, advise, counsel, or
defend within this state any person charged with any crime,
misdemeanor, or breach of any penal statute or ordinance[.]"
However, there appears to be no similar statutory restriction on
city attorneys. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1990)
(setting forth prosecutorial powers and duties of city attorney).
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the necessary on-the-record inquiry (Transcr. 2/8/90 (hereafter
"TB.") 3-26).
1987)•

See State v, Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah

Although the court granted defendant's request for self-

representation, it allowed defendant to have his appointed
counsel conduct opening and closing statements and to conduct the
examinations of certain witnesses; defendant was allowed to
examine the witnesses he wished to as part of his selfrepresentation (TB. 22-23, 26-27; T. 20, 173). This initial
arrangement amounted to hybrid representation, something to which
defendant was not constitutionally entitled.

United States v.

Hill, 526 P.2d 1019, 1024-25 (10th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 425
U.S. 940 (1976); Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 198-99 (Del.
1980).

See also LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 11.5(f)

(1984).
In arguing that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel, defendant first focuses on the cross-examinations of
Richard Anderson and Eric Tilley, who were prosecution witnesses
(T. 398, 497). Br. of Appellant at 17. After defendant had
cross-examined Anderson, defendant's appointed counsel, Thomas
Willmore, requested and ultimately received permission to conduct
additional cross-examination of the witness (T. 386, 388, 39396).

During the in-chambers conference where the court granted

that permission, defendant indicated that he desired for Mr.
Willmore to take over completely his representation at trial (T.
397).

The following exchange took place:
[Defendant]: I'll turn the trial over to Mr.
Willmore, the whole entire thing.
The Court:

Is that your desire?
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[Defendant]:
The Court:
that.

That's my desire.
I'd certainly advise you to do

. . .

The Court: Are you prepared to do that, Tom?
Mr. Willmore: I wasn't prepared to question
Richard Anderson and Eric Tilley, but i will
do it.
The Court: Of course you've been to the
preliminary hearing, you have the benefit of
the transcript of their testimony —
Mr. Willmore: Yes.
The Court:

—

Three other times.

Mr. Willmore: I've gone over it all, but as
far as being prepared to the point where I
normally am, what I would like to be, I am
not. But I will go ahead, if that's what Don
[the defendant] wants.
[Defendant]:
The Court:
choose.

That's right.

You can choose.

[Defendant]:
The Court:

I'll let you

I choose Mr. Willmore.
[I]f you're willing to do it.

Mr. Willmore:

Don would rather I do —

The Court: Fine. All right.
we'll do from this point.

That's what

(T. 397-98).
Thus, although defendant fails to make it clear in his
brief, Mr. Willmore, at the time he cross-examined Anderson and
at all times thereafter, acted as defendant's counsel, and
defendant no longer represented himself.
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Defendant alleges that Mr. Willmore's crossexaminations of Anderson and Tilley constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel because Willmore indicated that he was not
as prepared as he might otherwise have been to examine those
witnesses.

However, he levels this allegation with absolutely no

discussion of the cross-examinations actually conducted by Mr.
Willmore or how those examinations were either deficient or
prejudicial.
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result of the trial would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Carter,
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405
(Utah 1986).

A "[d]efendant must prove that specific, identified

acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.

The claim may not be speculative, but must

be a demonstrative reality[.],f

Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. And, the

deficient performance must be so prejudicial as "to undermine
confidence in the reliability of the verdict."

Ibid.

Here, defendant fails to meet either the deficient
performance prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.
As to his claim regarding counsel's allegedly deficient crossexamination of two prosecution witnesses, defendant does not
identify how counsel's performance was deficient, and does not
articulate how it was prejudicial beyond his speculative,
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unsupported assertion that M[c]areful, well-prepared crossexamination would probably have shown at most, that Defendant's
conduct was . • • manslaughter, or . . . aggravated assault."
Br. of Appellant at 19-20.
Defendant's additional claim of ineffectiveness is
similarly without merit.

He argues that he was denied effective

assistance because counsel, despite defendant's request, declined
to call as a defense witness Ray Cabututan who, along with
defendant and others, was charged with the murder of Miguel
Ramirez (R. 2-3). Referring to page 270 of an uncertified
transcript which purportedly reflects Cabututan's testimony at
Cabututan's separate trial, defendant seemingly suggests that
Cabututan's testimony concerning a wrench would have been helpful
to defendant.

Br. of Appellant at 18-19.

While defendant's

failure to analyze the significance of this purported testimony
would alone be an adequate ground for rejecting his
ineffectiveness claim, the Court should decline to consider the
claim because it is not adequately supported by the record.
First, the transcript attached as Exhibit B to
defendant's brief is neither certified nor part of the record on
appeal.

An even more fundamental defect in the transcript is

that it does not identify the witness who is testifying.

In

short, defendant fails to support his claim concerning
Cabututan's purported testimony with an adequate record on
appeal.

Accordingly, this Court should not review the claim.

State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985).

Furthermore,

defendant provides no record support for his assertion that he
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asked counsel to call Cabututan as a witness, and that counsel
declined.

It is well settled that this Court cannot consider

matters outside of the record.

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297

(Utah 1986); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Court should
affirm defendant's convictions and remand the case to the trial
court for reconsideration of the order assessing defense costs to
defendant as part of his sentence.
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